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The State, Civil Society, and 
Citizenship by Richard Dagger 
I order for the general will to be well expressed," Rousseau 
declared in his Social Contract, "it is therefore important that 
there be no partial society in the State, and that each citizen give 
only his own opinion... If there are partial societies, their number 
must be multiplied and their inequality prevented..." (see 
Rousseau, 1978, p. 61). Rousseau's preference for a body politic 
in which there are no "partial societies"--no factions or interest 
groups, that is?is sometimes cited as evidence of the totalitarian 
implications of his political theory. For if nothing stands be 
tween the individual and the state, according to this charge, it is 
all too easy for the state to dominate and control all aspects of the 
individual's life. 
As a criticism of Rousseau's intentions or wisdom, this charge 
is mistaken. Rousseau thought that abody poh tic would do better 
without "partial societies" only under certain limited conditions 
-notably a citizenry small enough for the sovereign people to 
meet and deliberate conveniently with one another. As a com 
plaint about the attempt to eliminate the groups and associations 
that fall between the modern state and the individual, however, 
the criticism is ftilly justified. When fascism and communism 
have come to power in this century, the rulers have tried to 
smother "partial societies." To the extent that they have suc 
ceeded, they have smothered freedom as well. This was obvious 
to the numbers of Solidarity and the other Central European 
opposition groups who struggled against communist regimes in 
the 1980s to make room for independent trade unions and other 
features of civil society (see Ash, 1990, pp. 147-8). It should now 
be obvious toeveryone. 
In large, modern societies, then, we should make the most of 
"partial societies" by encouraging the development of a vital 
civil society-a sphere of life that promotes freedom through 
private activity and the voluntary associations that serve as a 
buffer between individuals and the state. Indeed, the question is 
not whether civil society is a prerequisite for a good society, but 
what form it should take. With this in mind, I want to offer three 
observations about the proper form of civil society. 
First, weshouldnotethat we owe the distinction between state 
and civil society to Hegel. Before his Philosophy of Right, "civil 
society" was simply another term for political association (see 
Riedel, 1984, ch. 6). In Hegel's hands, however, "civil society" 
designated an area between domestic Ufe and the fuUy poUtical 
order-an area in which commerce regulated by contracts and 
governed by the rule of law could take place. In this sense civil 
society was, and continues to be, civiUzed society. It is distinct 
from the state because the activities of civil society are private 
that is, concerned with the personal interests of the participants 
but it is nevertheless dependent upon the state. For without the 
state to guarantee the rule of law, there could be no civil society. 
(continued on page 12) 
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The second observation is that civil society presupposes 
a kind of equality. "Civil society overlaps with the concept of 
exchange," as Antony Black puts it, "which also connotes 
equality of status between parties" (see Black, 1984, p. 32). This 
equality of status implies an equal right to pursue one's interests 
within civil society-including a right to join with others for 
mutual benefit. When these interests come into conflict, the 
citizens may defend their rights and pursue their interests by 
going to court, where they are supposed to enjoy equal favor in 
the eyes of the law. 
These two observations present a paradox. On the one 
hand, civil society is an intermediate realm, one that protects 
individuals against the overwhelming power of the state. On the 
other hand, civil society depends upon the state for its existence. 
My final observation adds a complication to this paradox. 
"Indeed, the question is not whether civil society 
is a prerequisitefor a good society, but whatform 
it should take." 
The complication is that civil society can, and often 
does, embrace forms of association that blur the boundaries 
between private and public activity. Churches, charities, and 
civic organizations such as the Kiwanis and Soroptimists pro 
vide clear examples of these associations. The best examples, 
though, are neighboihood associations and parent-teacher orga 
nizations, for they illustrate how the "private citizen" can work 
with agents of the state-municipal officials, school principals, 
and so on-on matters of public concern. And these examples are 
but a step short of jury duty, where the "private citizen" becomes, 
for a time, a public official. 
If civil society stands between domestic life and the 
state, then, it need not stand as a barrier between the two. On the 
contrary, civil society can best promote the good society when it 
serves as an intermediary between the official business of 
government and the personal affairs of the individual. There is, to 
be sure, the risk that civil society will degenerate into factional 
ism or interest group liberalism as various groups compete to 
advance their interests by capturing or controlling some part of 
the government. The sense of community and of public purpose 
dwindle when this happens; cynicism sets in and apathy prevails 
as more and more people come to regard politics as the public 
pursuit of private interests. But steps can be taken to avoid or 
overcome this danger. 
One step is to increase the number and enhance the 
strength of those groups, such as neighboihood associations, that 
connect the private and public aspects of citizenship. Involve 
ment in organizations of this sort can improve communication 
between individuals and their government while fostering a 
better understanding of politics and a sense of civic responsibil 
ity. They cultivate a regard for the public good as they bring 
people into public Ufe, in other words, thus providing a safeguard 
against cynicism and apathy. 
A second step is to prevent any group or groups from 
gaining enough power to dominate everyone else. This is what 
Rousseau had in mind when, anticipating James Madison, he 
insisted that, if there are to be partial societies, then they must be 
numerous and roughly equal in power. In the United States, we 
have partial societies in great numbers, but they are far from 
equal. To achieve this rough equality, entrepreneurial opportuni 
ties must remain open, especially for the formation of coopera 
tives and small businesses. A more significant redistribution of 
wealth through taxation is also necessary, as are various mea 
sures designed to prevent money from exercising too great an 
influence on campaigns and elections. Public financing of 
elections is probably the best solution, but strict limits on 
expenditures for campaign advertising or even on the length of 
campaigns would also help. By contributing to a roughly equal 
distribution of power in civil society, such measures would also 
support the equal status-equality as citizens in the eyes of the 
law-that civil society presupposes. 
Ovil society can indeed promote the good society by 
serving as a buffer between the individual and the state. But this 
is not all that it can or should do. Civil society must also be civil 
in two senses of the word. First, it must promote civility in the 
sense of a decent regard for the rights nd interests of others. This 
includes respect for the privacy and property of others so long as 
it is consistent with the equality under the law that all are 
supposed to enjoy as citizens. Then, second, civil society must 
promote civility in the sense of civic responsibility or virtue-of 
citizenship as an active concern for the public good. Through 
associations that join private life to public concerns, individuals 
must be encouraged to see how their interests connect with 
others, and thus to develop a sense of community. They must 
also see the state or government not as some remote and alien 
force, but as a partner in a common enterprise. For the irony is 
that civil society best protects us against the overwhelming 
power of the state when it makes the state familiar to us. The wall 
of separation may have its place, but it is not where state and civil 
society come together. 
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